The blockade escalates! China's photovoltaic industry's "detour export" strategy has also been blocked…

In the past few years, Europe has been loudly advocating for energy transition while simultaneously importing Chinese photovoltaic products. Many people even believed that, amid the anxiety over power shortages, Europe's dependence on Chinese solar products would only deepen.

But now, the winds are shifting.

Recently, the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) officially released the complete technical specifications for the ninth round of the 'AO PPE2 PV Sol' ground-mounted solar PV tender, with a total capacity of 925 MW in this round.

Compared to the bidding volume, what has truly shaken the industry is the 'supply chain resilience standard' written into the document — it explicitly prohibits system assembly from being completed in a 'dominant third country' outside the EU, while requiring that the three core components — inverters, solar cells, and modules — must not come from that country.

What's more noteworthy is that this is not an isolated move. Less than two weeks ago (April 26), the European Commission just announced that it would stop providing EU funding support for energy projects using Chinese-made modules, cells, and inverters. Looking further back, France has repeatedly signaled intentions such as 'localized procurement, supply chain security, and reducing dependence on Chinese photovoltaics.'

In other words, Europe's restrictions on Chinese photovoltaics are shifting from verbal de-Sinicization to hard constraints actually written into bidding, financing, and subsidy systems.

I.It's not about raising tariffs — it's about directly changing the rules

If in the past, Europe's actions against Chinese photovoltaics were mostly limited to tariffs, subsidy investigations, and public opinion, this time France has directly written restrictions into the bidding rules.

And the intensity of these restrictions is more thorough than many had anticipated.

According to the latest bidding documents released by the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), companies bidding for this round of 925MW ground-mounted solar PV projects must simultaneously meet multiple 'supply chain resilience' requirements. On the surface, this emphasizes supply chain security; but when you break it down, almost every rule precisely targets China's photovoltaic industry chain.

First, the assembly stage is directly restricted. The document clearly states that if the photovoltaic system is ultimately assembled in a 'dominant third country' outside the EU, the project will lose its bidding qualification. Note that the restriction here is no longer limited to the source of components — even the final assembly location is now subject to review.

This means that even if a project's raw materials and components all come from Europe or other regions, as long as the final complete system is assembled in an area defined as a 'dominant third country,' it will still be deemed non-compliant. In simple terms, many companies used to bypass restrictions through overseas OEM or third-country assembly, but this time, France has directly blocked that route as well.

Second, there is the so-called '8-choose-4' rule. The bidding document lists eight key stages, including polysilicon, ingots, wafers, cells, photovoltaic glass, modules, inverters, and mounting systems. France requires that at least four of these eight items must not come from a 'dominant third country.'

On the surface, this might seem to leave some room, but the real kicker lies in the additional condition that follows. The document further emphasizes that the three core components — inverters, solar cells, and modules — must all fall under the category of 'not from a dominant third country.'

In other words, it's not just a simple 'choose 4 out of 8' rule; instead, it directly singles out the most critical and valuable links in the chain.

And this happens to be precisely where Chinese companies have their strongest advantages. It's worth noting that currently, over 80% of the global photovoltaic industry chain's production capacity is concentrated in China — from polysilicon to modules to inverters, Chinese companies cover almost the entire manufacturing system. That's precisely why, even though the bidding document never explicitly mentions the word 'China,' everyone in the industry knows exactly who is being targeted.

To some extent, what Europe now wants to restrict is no longer just a specific product, but the very way China's entire photovoltaic supply chain exists within the European market.

II.From dependence to restriction — the EU's blockade escalates layer by layer...

In 2022, Europe's energy crisis erupted — natural gas prices skyrocketed, electricity costs spiraled out of control, and Chinese solar photovoltaics suddenly became one of Europe's most sought-after commodities. A massive influx of Chinese solar modules flooded the European market, pushing Europe's solar installations to consecutive record highs, and Chinese companies rapidly expanded their market share by capitalizing on this surge in demand.

However, as the share of new energy installations grew, Europe began to realize that while it was installing more and more solar power plants, control over the industrial chain was slipping further out of its hands. From polysilicon and wafers to cells, modules, and inverters, Chinese companies had covered nearly every critical link across the entire supply chain.

As a result, starting in 2024, Europe's efforts to "reduce its dependence on Chinese solar" began to accelerate noticeably.

The first to take effect was the EU's Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA). Implemented in June 2024, its core goal is to boost Europe's domestic clean energy manufacturing capacity and reduce reliance on a single external supply chain.

Under the rules, starting from December 30, 2025, at least 30% of projects in each member state's annual solar photovoltaic tenders must meet "non-price criteria" — meaning they must use at least four key "non-Chinese-made" components, including cells, modules, inverters, and structural parts.

In other words, where competition once centered on price and efficiency, it now revolves around supply chain identity.

And this is only the beginning. In August 2025, Italy went a step further, issuing a new decree that, for the first time at the national level, explicitly stated that certain key photovoltaic equipment must not be of Chinese origin.

By April 2026, the EU had further announced that it would stop providing EU funding subsidies for energy projects using Chinese-made modules, cells, and inverters. The scope of restrictions not only covered projects within Europe but also extended to projects outside the EU that are connected to the European grid, such as those in North Africa and the Balkans.

Now, with France formally incorporating "supply chain resilience standards" into its bidding documents, the entire logic has become increasingly clear. What Europe is doing now is no longer just supporting domestic manufacturing — it is establishing a new set of rules for the new energy supply chain.

For Chinese solar companies, future global competition may no longer be about who has the lower cost, but about who better fits the rules.

III.After the blockade escalates, how can Chinese solar photovoltaics still go global?

If in the past, the weapon of Chinese solar photovoltaics going global was low cost, then now, that logic is being rewritten. Because this round of European restrictions is no longer targeting just the products themselves, but the entire supply chain.

That's why, in the past two years, Chinese solar companies have clearly begun to accelerate overseas factory construction. Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the United States, and even Europe itself have become new focal points for expansion. The reason is actually quite practical: since the market is beginning to emphasize localization, companies must enter the local system as much as possible.

But the problem is that Europe is now even starting to restrict "third-country transshipment." In the past, some companies could still enter European and American markets through assembly in Southeast Asia and other means; today, France's new regulations have clearly begun to block this path.

In other words, truly effective globalization in the future may no longer be simply overseas OEM, but deeper localized manufacturing capabilities — including local supply chains, local certifications, local operations, and even local capital cooperation. Put bluntly, what will matter in the future is no longer just whether you can manufacture, but whether you can integrate.

In fact, leading domestic companies have already begun to adjust their direction. For example, LONGi Green Energy's focus in the European market this year is no longer simply selling modules, but upgrading to an "integrated solar-plus-storage" system capability, promoting the implementation of solar-storage synergy solutions in centralized scenarios.

This actually reflects a very clear change: in the future, what Chinese solar companies sell when going global may no longer be just products, but overall solutions.

Of course, looking at it from another angle, this may not be entirely a bad thing.

In the past few years, China's solar photovoltaic industry has been deeply mired in price wars. Many companies have been competing so hard that their profits have become thinner and thinner, and the industry has become increasingly involuted. While this round of rule changes in Europe has raised the threshold, to some extent, it is also forcing Chinese companies to upgrade — in areas like technological capability, system integration capability, brand capability, and global operational capability. And these are precisely the areas where China's solar photovoltaic industry has been relatively weak in the past.

For Chinese solar companies, the real question they face next may no longer be whether they can sell, but under what identity they can continue to stay in the global market.